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Abstract
We study how the global schooling increase during the 20th century aﬀected
structural transformation by changing the supply of agricultural labor. We
develop an analytical model of frictional labor reallocation out of agriculture to
infer changes in birth-cohort characteristics from observed data on agricultural
employment. Bringing the model to microdata from 52 countries, we find that
the increase in schooling was accompanied by a large shift of the labor force’s
comparative advantage away from agriculture. We bring empirical evidence to
suggest this relationship was causal. With fixed prices, the resulting decrease in
the supply of agricultural workers can account for almost half of the observed
reallocation out of agriculture. However, in general equilibrium, the net eﬀect
is ambiguous.
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1 Introduction
Imagine to randomly extract a 25 years old man from the world population in 1950. We would
expect this individual to have spent, on average, less than four years of his life in a classroom.1 If
we repeat the same exercise in 2010, we would get a very diﬀerent answer. On average, a young
man in 2010 has spent almost nine and a half years of his life in school. This thought experiment
illustrates the dramatic and global increase in schooling observed in the second half of the last
century.
Figure I: Global Increase in Average Years Spent in School
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Notes: average years of schooling is calculated taking the average, weighted by age-specific population, across all
countries the 146 countries present in the dataset.
It is plausible to argue that the steep increase in schooling deeply transformed the labor force.
In particular, if the skills learned in school are more useful out of agriculture, as suggested by the
extensive evidence on sorting of high-skilled workers across sectors,2 then the global increase in
schooling would have shifted the comparative advantage of many workers away from agriculture,
thus eﬀectively reducing – for fixed prices – the amount of agricultural labor. In turn, this reduction
in the relative supply of agricultural labor might have aﬀected the aggregate rate of structural
transformation.
In this paper, we formally study this hypothesis, with the overarching goal of answering whether
schooling increase can cause structural transformation. Towards this aim, we ask three instrumental
questions. We study i) whether the supply of agricultural workers decreased and by how much – i.e.
1Authors’ calculations using Barro and Lee (2013), see Figure I.
2See Gollin et al. (2013), Young (2013), and more recently Hicks et al. (2017).
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whether the labor force changed becoming more biased towards non-agriculture; ii) whether the
increase in schooling played an important role in this change; and iii) the implications, in general
equilibrium, for the aggregate rate of labor reallocation out of agriculture.
To answer the first question, we need to provide a methodology to measure, in a consistent
way across countries and over time, whether and by how much the labor force became more biased
towards non-agriculture. We use a revealed preference approach, building on the simple insight that
the share of individuals of a birth-cohort engaged in agriculture could provide useful information. In
the presence of within-cohort skill heterogeneity, some, but not all, individuals of each birth-cohort
should move towards the non-agricultural sector and, as the cohort’s average comparative advantage
in non-agriculture increases – for example, due to an increase in schooling, – more individuals would
find it worthwhile to work in that sector.3 However, though valuable, the average non-agricultural
employment of a birth-cohort does not provide a full mapping into cohort-level characteristics.
The reason being that younger cohorts not only diﬀer in their relative return from agricultural
production, but they are also exposed to diﬀerent aggregate economic conditions. Therefore, in
order to properly measure by how much did the labor force become more biased towards non-
agriculture, we develop a simple model as guide.
We build a dynamic, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model of frictional labor
reallocation out of agriculture. The model has three exogenous driving forces: the human capital
of new birth-cohorts; the relative sectoral productivity; and an exogenous shifter aﬀecting relative
demand for agricultural goods. There are two types of agents in the economy: workers decide in
which sector to work, subject to a switching cost; firms, in both sectors, compete for workers. As
usual, goods and labor markets clear in equilibrium, determining relative agricultural price and
wage. We assume that human capital is more valued in the non-agricultural sector, which implies
that the supply of agricultural labor is determined by the average level of human capital of the
cohorts in the labor market. The demand for agricultural labor, instead, is determined by changes
in agricultural revenue productivity. Changes in the relative supply and demand of agricultural
labor determine the equilibrium rate of labor reallocation out of agriculture.
The model provides an analytical map between diﬀerences across cohorts in agricultural em-
ployment and their comparative advantage towards agriculture. We prove that, if the data are
generated by our model, a cohort-level regression of log agricultural employment on year, cohort
and age dummies allows us to recover the changes in the cohort average human capital, and thus
in the aggregate supply of agricultural workers. The year dummies capture the demand for agricul-
tural labor. The age dummies control for the eﬀect of reallocation frictions. One of the advantages
of our revealed preference approach is that we don’t need to use relative wages or prices, which
are, especially in developing countries, hard to observe and often unreliable. Instead, we prove
that data on quantities is enough to identify, leveraging the structure of the model, the objects of
interest.
As is well known, we cannot run a fully saturated regression with year, cohort and age dummies.
Due to their collinearity, we need to impose at least one linear restriction. The model implies that
3Throughout the paper, we use “sectors” to refer to agriculture and non-agriculture.
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we should restrict the age eﬀects to be identical in the first two periods that a cohort is working.
We bring the model-implied empirical specification to the data. We use micro-level data avail-
able from IPUMS International for 52 countries around the world. For each country, the data are
either censuses or large sample labor force surveys representative of the population, and we have
at least two repeated cross-sections, which allow us to compute labor reallocation over time. On
average, for each country there are 28 years from the oldest to the most recent cross-section. For
some countries, such as Brazil, our data cover half a century of labor reallocation. The 52 countries
cover two thirds of the world population, and span five continents and the income distribution from
Liberia to the United States.
We run the year-cohort-age regression separately for each country, which allows the structural
parameters to be country-specific. The regressions recover country-year eﬀects, which are a measure
of the demand for agricultural labor, and country-cohort eﬀects, which are a measure of cohort-level
comparative advantage towards agriculture. Using the estimates, we can statistically decompose the
observed aggregate rate of labor reallocation into changes in the year eﬀects, and changes in cohort
eﬀects of the active cohorts. The statistical decomposition has a structural interpretation through
the lens of the model. The cohort component captures the aggregate eﬀect of changes in the supply
of agricultural labor, for fixed prices. The year component captures the aggregate eﬀect of changes
in the demand of agricultural labor, which depends on the relative prices and productivities, but
might also be aﬀected by changes in the supply, through its eﬀect on the relative agricultural price.
The rate of labor reallocation out of agriculture was, on average across countries, approximately
2% in the period of our study. The year eﬀects declined on average at a rate of 1.20%, and the
cohort eﬀects at a rate of 0.80%. While there is some heterogeneity across countries, the cohort
eﬀects substantially declined in the overwhelming majority of them. Interpreting this statistical
decomposition through the model, we learn that the decrease in the supply of agricultural workers
would generate, keeping prices fixed, as much as 40% of the observed global reallocation out of
agriculture. Overall, these results unveil a sizable decrease in the supply of agricultural labor in
most countries.
We next turn to the second question: did the schooling increase play a role in the decrease of
the supply of agricultural workers? To answer this question we need to address the apparent causal
inference concern. We would ideally measure the eﬀect of an exogenous schooling shock on labor
reallocation across sectors. However, we are not aware of any credible instrument for schooling that
is available in all (or even most) countries in our sample. We thus follow a second best strategy:
we exploit three distinct sources of variation to draw a broad picture on the role of schooling in
shaping cohort-level comparative advantage towards non-agriculture.
First, following the identification strategy of Duflo (2001), we exploit school construction in
Indonesia as a shock to cohort-level schooling. We find evidence supporting a causal link between
schooling and the supply of agricultural workers: individuals in the cohorts aﬀected by the school
construction are less likely to be employed in agriculture. While appealing, this result is limited to
only one country in our sample.
Therefore, we then use within-country cross-cohort variation in average schooling and agricul-
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tural employment. We run, separately for each country in our sample, a regression of the cohort
dummies identified from the previously described regressions on cohort-level average schooling,
controlling for a cubic trend. In almost all countries in our sample, we uncover a significant nega-
tive relationship: cohorts that are relatively more educated than the trend, have also lower cohort
dummies – i.e. a lower comparative advantage for agriculture. The magnitude of the relationship
is sizable: when pooling all countries together, an additional year of schooling is associated with a
17% decrease (not 17 percentage points) in agricultural employment relative to the baseline.
We should be cautious in interpreting this result as causal. Direct reverse causality is not an
issue since we measure agricultural employment after schooling is completed. Selection of higher
skilled individuals into schooling and out of agriculture is also not an issue since we are studying
cohort-level outcomes. However, two other relevant concerns remain. First, parents may decide
to invest more in their children’s education if they expect a higher future return from school (see
Adukia et al. (2017)). Second, schooling may be a signal of other cohort-level characteristics, such
as early-life human capital investment, rather than the determinant of returns from non-agricultural
production. We can alleviate the first concern, but at the cost of making the second one possibly
more severe, by instrumenting for schooling using exposure to the cyclical component of GDP
during youth. Results using this specification have comparable magnitude to the benchmark ones.
Third, we use variation across countries. We show that countries that have experienced a faster
increase in aggregate schooling have also experienced a larger decrease in the supply of agricultural
workers, as measured by the change in the cohort eﬀects.
While each one of the three strategies have limitations, we conclude that the overall evidence
points to a relevant role of schooling in explaining the decrease in the supply of agricultural workers.
Finally, we address the third question and study the aggregate implications of the decrease in
the supply of agricultural labor. The model provides analytical equations that map the empirically
estimated changes in the supply of agricultural workers to their aggregate eﬀects. The map is
modulated by several parameters capturing the strength of the general equilibrium in the labor
and goods market, and the relationship between observed cohort eﬀects and unobserved human
capital stocks. Since these parameters are likely to vary across countries, for example, as a function
of trade-openness, we provide a range of estimates for the aggregate eﬀects of the changes in supply.
First, we consider the simplest benchmark, where both the labor and goods’ markets are in
partial equilibrium. In this case, the estimated cohort component of labor reallocation directly
maps into the aggregate counterfactual of no change in the supply of agricultural workers. We
would thus conclude that the decrease in the supply of agricultural workers explained, on average,
40% of total labor reallocation out of agriculture. Second, we consider a small open economy with
no trade frictions – i.e. we let the path for relative agricultural prices be exogenous. We show that
the contribution of the supply of agricultural labor to aggregate reallocation decreases from the
previous 40% to 16-36%, depending on parameter estimates. Third and last, we show that when
also the goods market is in general equilibrium, a decrease in the supply of agricultural labor could
actually pull workers into agriculture, as long as the price elasticity is suﬃciently large – i.e. if the
elasticity of substitution across sectors is below one – and the demand eﬀect is suﬃciently small.
4
This conclusion is, in fact, not surprising, and mirrors the result in Matsuyama (1992a): changes
in relative productivity may have opposite implications in an open and a closed economy.
We return to our main question: does schooling cause structural transformation? We have
shown that the increase in schooling transformed the labor force by shifting their relative compar-
ative advantage towards non-agricultural production. However, the aggregate implications of such
a shift probably diﬀer across countries, spanning a large range, from at most minor to very signif-
icant. While we don’t provide a definitive answer to the main question we posed, we nonetheless
argue that any credible quantitative estimation of the drivers of structural transformation cannot
fail to consider – as has been mostly done in the literature so far – both the changes in the supply
of agricultural workers, and the role of schooling in determining it.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a simplified framework to illustrate
how we measure cohort characteristics using a revealed preference approach. In Section 3, we
describe the data and lay out the basic statistical decomposition of aggregate labor reallocation
into cohort- and year-eﬀects. In Section 4, we build a general equilibrium OLG model of frictional
labor reallocation out of agriculture. In Section 5 we use the model as a measuring tool to back out
from the data how much the global comparative advantage of the labor force shifted away from the
agricultural sector. In Section 6, we establish the role of schooling in changing the characteristics
of the labor force. In Section 7, we study how the changes in the characteristics of the labor force
aﬀect structural transformation, in general equilibrium.
Related Literature. We build on the work of Caselli and Coleman II (2001) and Acemoglu
and Guerrieri (2008). To our knowledge, Caselli and Coleman II (2001) first argued that the
supply of agricultural workers might be relevant to understand structural change. It noticed that
non-agriculture is more skill-intensive than agriculture, and, therefore, an aggregate increase in
schooling raises the relative supply of non-agricultural workers. It focused on the eﬀect of human
capital increase on relative wages, and argued that taking it into account is necessary to match the
path of relative agricultural wages. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) formalized the general insight
that changes in the relative prices of inputs – in our case, agricultural and non-agricultural workers
– may lead to structural transformation if sectors vary in the intensity with which they use inputs.
These two papers developed the notion that changes in the supply of agricultural workers
could contribute to reallocation out of agriculture. Our contribution is to develop and apply a
methodology to measure the actual changes in the supply of agricultural workers for many countries,
link them to changes in schooling, and quantify their aggregate impact.
With respect to this aim of separating the role of labor demand and supply as drivers of sectoral
reallocation, our work is, in fact, most closely related to Lee and Wolpin (2006). Lee and Wolpin
(2006) devised and structurally estimated a rich model to study the process of labor reallocation
from manufacturing to services in the United States. We see our work as complementary, to the
extent that we are interested in a similar question, but we tackle it from a radically diﬀerent
perspective. Specifically, our approach aims to impose the minimal structure to interpret the data,
closer in spirit to the accounting literature.
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More broadly, our work is related to a rich literature that studied the contribution of human
capital, as measured by years of schooling, to growth and development. This literature showed
that the level of human capital is significantly correlated with consequent growth (See Nelson and
Phelps (1966), Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), and more recently Valencia Caicedo (2018)).
To our knowledge, we are the first to measure the eﬀects of changes in human capital on the supply
of agricultural workers and the reallocation of labor out of agriculture.
Our model combines elements and insights already presents in Matsuyama (1992b), Lucas
(2004), and more recently in Herrendorf and Schoellman (2017) and Bryan and Morten (2017).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a tractable framework to analytically
characterize labor reallocation by cohorts in a context with general mobility frictions. Hsieh et al.
(2016) also exploits year and cohort eﬀects to calibrate a model of allocation of talent. It uses them
to discipline the relative role, for the aggregate eﬃciency of the allocation of talent, of changes in
frictions that aﬀect human capital investment and frictions that distort the labor market. Relative
to this paper, we focus on a simpler framework that allows us to analytically consider fixed-cost-
type frictions, which turn out to be crucial to correctly identify the role of changes in the supply
of agricultural workers.
Finally, our work relates to a growing literature that uses longitudinal wage data to reconsider
the agricultural productivity gaps and that shows that these gaps are more consistent with sort-
ing across-sectors than with large mobility frictions; (Alvarez (2017), Herrendorf and Schoellman
(2017), and Hicks et al. (2017)). We contribute to this literature in two ways: we provide a model
that highlights when wage data can be informative on frictions; and we show, without relying on
wage data, additional evidence corroborating the sorting explanation and casting doubts on the
presence of large mobility frictions.
2 The Simple Benchmark: Frictionless and in Partial Equilibrium
We build a simplified framework and use it to illustrate how changes in cohort-level character-
istics can be measured through a revealed preference approach. Further, the framework provides a
structural interpretation to the empirical regressions in Section 3.
2.1 Simplest Model of Labor Reallocation out of Agriculture
Time, indexed by a subscript t, is discrete and runs infinitely from time 0. We consider a
dynamic economy inhabited by N +1 overlapping cohorts, indexed by the subscript c. Each cohort
is made of a mass 1N+1 individuals, indexed by ", which determines their relative return from non-
agricultural production, or comparative advantage. Therefore, each individual is fully characterized
by a couple (c, "). We let " be distributed as a Beta (v, 1), whose CDF we label F ("). There are
two sectors in the economy: agriculture and non-agriculture. Wages per eﬃciency unit in each
sector are exogenous and are given by wA,t in agriculture and wM,t in non-agriculture. Wages
grow over time at rates gA,t and gM,t. Each individual supplies inelastically one unit of labor if he
works in agriculture and h (c, ") units of labor if he works out of agriculture. Therefore, he would
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receive income wA,t in agriculture and wM,th (c, ") in non-agriculture. Individuals use income to
buy an aggregate consumption good, which is supplied inelastically and for which they have a
non-satiated utility. h (c, ") should be interpreted as the individual relative comparative advantage
of non-agricultural activity and takes the form
h (c, ") = h c "
1   ,
where  is a scale constant that we assume to be large enough to guarantee that for each cohort, as
we observe in the data, at least some worker is not-employed in agriculture; hc is a cohort-specific
shifter that modulates the average cohort-level non-agricultural bias; and   modulates the relative
importance of between- and within-cohort heterogeneity since when   is equal to 1 all individuals
within a cohort are identical and when   is equal to 0 all cohorts are identical. We will refer to
h (c, ") as human capital.
Individuals choose frictionlessly, in each period in which they are alive, in which sector to work.
We define !t (c, ") to be occupational choice function of individual (c, ") at time t, where !t (c, ") is
equal to 1 if the individual chooses to work in agriculture and 0 otherwise. Given the assumptions,
individuals choose in each period the sector that provides them with the higher income. As a result
the occupational choice is given by
!t (c, ") =
8<:1 if wM,th (c, ") < wA,t0 otherwise
and generates a cutoﬀ policy within each cohort, such that all the individuals with "  "ˆt (c) =
(wA,t)
1
1   (h cwM,t)
  11   are employed in agriculture.
Cohort-Level Agricultural Employment. The model implies that the share of individuals of
a cohort c employed in agriculture at time t – lA,t (c) ⌘ log
´
!t (c, ") dF (") – is given by:
log lA,t (c) = ˆ+
v
1    log
✓
wA,t
wM,t
◆
| {z }
Market Conditions
  v 
1    log hc| {z }
Cohort Characteristics
, (1)
where ˆ is a time and cohort invariant function of parameters.
Changes in Aggregate Agricultural Employment. The aggregate share of employment in
agriculture at time t is LA,t =
Pt
c=t N lA,t (c), and its change between two periods is given by4
log
LA,t+1
LA,t
=
v
1   
✓
log
gA,t
gM,t
◆
| {z }
Change in Demand
+ log
0@Pt+1c=t+1 N h  v 1  cPt
c=t N h
  v 1  
c
1A
| {z }
Change in Supply
. (2)
4The model presented in this section is a special case of the model presented in Section 4. In that section we
provide the derivation for all the analytical expressions.
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Aggregate labor reallocation out of agricultural can be driven either by a change in market con-
ditions which make agricultural labor paid less or by a change in the characteristics of the labor
force which is biased towards non-agriculture. The first mechanism is a decrease in the demand for
agricultural labor, while the second is a decrease in the supply of agricultural labor.
The literature interested in structural transformation has focused on several mechanisms, either
working through non-homothetic utility or unbalanced productivity growth, that generate changes
in the demand for agricultural workers. The goal of this paper is, instead, to empirically isolate
and quantify the changes in the supply of agricultural workers, relate them to the global increase
in schooling, and study whether and under which conditions they can lead to aggregate labor
reallocation. The simple insight of the paper is that agricultural-employment by birth-cohort can
reveal such changes. We next illustrate this argument with an example.
2.2 Inference Through Cohort-Level Agricultural Employment
In Figures IIa and IIb we plot labor reallocation out of agriculture by cohort for two hypothetical
countries that have identical aggregate labor reallocation, but opposite patterns at the micro level.
In Figure IIa, all birth cohorts have, in a given year, an identical share of agricultural em-
ployment, and over time some individuals from each cohort move out of agriculture. Interpreted
through equation (1), we would infer from this figure that all cohorts must be identical, or hc = hc0
for all (c, c0). All cohorts behave identically at each point in time, indicating that only aggregate
changes in the demand for agricultural labor can be responsible for the observed reallocation.
In Figure IIb, instead, the agricultural employment for each cohort is constant over time, and
aggregate reallocation is driven by younger cohorts having a smaller share of workers in agriculture.
From this figure we would infer that cohorts are diﬀerent, but market conditions are identical in
each period, or otherwise we should observe some within-cohort labor reallocation over time. In
this second case, we would conclude that the demand for agricultural workers has not changed over
time. In fact, more individuals of younger cohorts find it worthwhile to move out of agriculture,
suggesting that the composition of the workforce, hence the supply of agricultural workers, is
changing.
Remarks. The one to one maps between cohort-level agricultural employment, cohort character-
istics and aggregate labor reallocation is an artifact of the assumptions of this simple model. The
more general setting of Section 4 will highlight two shortcomings of the current analysis. Frictions
in the labor reallocation will spoil the map between agricultural employment and cohort charac-
teristics, since age eﬀects will play a role. General equilibrium will aﬀect the map between changes
in the supply of agricultural workers and aggregate labor reallocation, since prices and wages will
adjust and possibly reverse the direct eﬀect of a decrease in supply highlight here.
Nonetheless, the simple insight is robust: cohort-level agricultural employment can shed light,
under some assumptions, on cohort characteristics, and both demand for and supply of agricultural
workers can play a major role for aggregate labor reallocation.
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Figure II: Labor Reallocation By Cohort, Two Opposite Cases
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(b) Through Cohort Eﬀects
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Notes: the two figures depicts two hypothetical countries with identical aggregate reallocation out of agriculture,
but specular micro patterns. Each solid line depicts the agricultural share of a birth-cohort. Darker lines are for
older cohorts. Each ten year cohort is followed for the years in which all its members would show up in our dataset
– i.e. the age of the younger individual of the cohort is larger than 25 and the age of the older one is lower than 60.
3 The Basic Empirical Decomposition: The Role of Cohort and Year Eﬀects
We use micro level data from 52 countries and document patterns on labor reallocation out of
agriculture by birth-cohorts. Most of the evidence available to date only covers aggregate rates of
reallocation, we are among the first to document micro level evidence on the behavior of diﬀerent
cohorts of workers in the process of structural transformation5.
3.1 Data
We use micro level data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)6. The data
are either censuses or large samples from labor force surveys that are representative of the entire
population. We include in our analysis all IPUMS countries for which we have available at least two
or more repeated cross-sections with available information on age, gender, and working industry,
and which span in total at least ten years. This gives us a sample of fifty two countries covering
about two thirds of the world population. For twenty three countries, we observe four or more
5Kim and Topel (1995), Lee and Wolpin (2006), and Perez (2017) document sectorial reallocation by cohort but
limit their focus to, respectively, South Korea and United States and Argentina. Hobijn et al. (2017) in ongoing work
are also using the IPUMS dataset to document patterns on reallocation by cohort. In particular, they document
results consistent to our Fact 1 below, but considering reallocation between three sectors.
6Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.5 [dataset], see(King et al. (2017)).
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cross-sections, for seventeen we observe three or more. On average, we observe countries over a
period of 28 years. For some countries, such as United States and Brazil, our data cover a long
time span of half a century or more of labor reallocation.
Table A.I in the online appendix7 lists the countries in our sample, the income level of each
country, in 2010, relative to the one of United States, the years of coverage, the agricultural
employment shares, and the number of observed cross-sections. In Figure A.I in the appendix,
we show that the aggregate agricultural shares from our data are comparable to the same results
from the World Development Indicators, which are an often used source of data on agricultural
employment, for example by the handbook chapter Herrendorf et al. (2014).
The countries in the sample comprise a wide range of income levels, from the United States to
Liberia and El Salvador. Eight countries are high-income countries, twenty five are middle-income
countries and the remaining nineteen are low-income8. Our sample also spans a large geographical
area, covering Asia and Oceania (nine countries), Africa (twelve countries), Central and South
America (nineteen countries), and Europe and North America (twelve countries).
We focus on males and restrict our attention to those aged 25 to 59. This is meant to capture
working age individuals and identify the period after education investment is completed. We
exclude women from the current analysis given the large cross-country diﬀerences in female labor
force participation.
3.2 Measurement
In each country j, for each cross section t, and for each cohort c, we compute the share of the
population in agriculture, lA,t,c,j . We normalize the values c to be equal to the birth year plus 25,
so that a birth cohort first enters into our dataset when c = t and it is last in the dataset when
c = t+N , where N = 59 25 = 34. We define kt,j to be the number of years between cross-section
t and the next cross-section in our data for country j.
We specify the log of the agricultural share to depend on a year and a cohort dummies:
log lA,t,c,j| {z }
agr share of cohort c at time t
= Yt,j|{z}
year dummies
+ Cc,j|{z}
cohort dummies
+ "t,c,j . (3)
This specification mirrors equation (1), which derived the observable empirical object in the simple
framework. The simple framework therefore provides a structural interpretation of the year and
cohort dummies as capturing market conditions and cohort characteristics.
This statistical decomposition restricts age to have no eﬀect on agricultural share. It is well
known that year, cohort and age are collinear, hence – even with panel data – it is not possible to
separately identify them.9 In order to include age dummies, we need to impose an additional linear
restriction. We will do so in Section 5, when we include the linear restriction which is consistent
7The online appendix is available at https://sites.google.com/view/tommaso-porzio. We next refer to it as,
simply, the appendix.
8By high-income (low-income) countries we mean those with income per capita greater (smaller) than 45% (10%)
of the one of the United States at PPP, in 2010.
9See Deaton (1997), and more recently Lagakos et al. (2017a).
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with the assumptions of the framework of Section 4.
The overall share of the population employed in agriculture in country j at time t is equal to the
sum of cohort-specific agricultural share, lA,t,c,j , weighted by the overall percentage of individuals
in each cohort, nt,c,j :10
LA,t,j =
tX
c=t N
nt,c,jlA,t,c,j .
Using this last equation, the aggregate yearly rate of labor reallocation between two periods t and
t+ kt,j – log gLA,t,j ⌘ log
LA,t+kt,j
LA,t
– can be shown to be given by a year component that captures
the change in the year eﬀects estimated from the year dummies, and a cohort component that
captures the change in the composition of cohort eﬀects of the active workforce
1
kt,j
 
logLA,t+kt,j ,j   logLA,t,j
 
| {z }
rate of labor reallocation
= log  ¯t,j| {z }
year component
+ log  ¯t,j| {z }
cohort component
+  t,j , (4)
where
log t,j ⌘ 1
kt,j
(Yt+k,j   Yt,j) (5)
log t,j ⌘ 1
kt,j
log
0@Pt+kt,jc=t+kt,j N nt+k,c,j exp (Cc,j)Pt
c=t N nt,c,j exp (Cc,j)
1A . (6)
This decomposition mirrors equation (2) previously derived. Under the assumptions of Section 2,
the year and cohort components, which can be computed in the data, map directed into changes
in the demand and supply of agricultural workers. While this simple mapping may not hold in
general, it provides a useful benchmark. The results could also be also interpreted a-theoretically
as a simple statistical decomposition which highlights the role of cohort eﬀects in generating labor
reallocation, thus motivating the rest of the paper.
We next decompose, for each country, labor reallocation according to specification (4), and
summarize their joint distributions across countries. Practically, for each country, we estimate
equation (3);11 we compute, for each pair of cross-sections, the annualized year and cohort compo-
nents, and calculate their average across all cross-sections.12 Formally, the average year and cohort
components are given by
log  ¯j =
1
|Tj |
P
t2Tj log t,j , log  ¯j =
1
|Tj |
P
t2Tj log t,j
10For few countries, notably India, we observe age-heaping. We adjust for it by smoothing out nt,c,j with a
quadratic equation. In Section C.1, we show that for all countries, but India, the adjustment is inconsequential.
11We estimate equation (3) in first diﬀerences to provide a tight map with the results of the model in section 4.
12We use this approach to assign to each country an equal weight, irrespective on the number of available cross-
sections of data. In Appendix (C), we report the disaggregated results for each country cross-section.
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where Tj is the set of all cross-sections available for country j excluding the most recent one, for
which we cannot calculate the reallocation rate.
Figure III: Labor Reallocation By Cohort, Two Examples
(a) Brazil
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Notes: the two figures plot agricultural employment by birth cohorts in Brazil and India over time. Each ten year
cohort is followed for the years in which all its members would show up in our dataset – i.e. the age of the younger
individual of the cohort is larger than 25 and the age of the older one is lower than 60. The average age of the cohort
in a given year is reported for the first and last year a cohort is observed.
3.3 Results
In Figures IIIa and IIIb we plot agricultural employment by cohort for two countries with
diﬀerent reallocation experiences, Brazil and India, to illustrate our methodology. Graphically, the
average year eﬀect, log  ¯j , is given by the average slope of the cohorts’ paths; while the average
cohort eﬀect, log  ¯j , is roughly given by the average within year vertical gaps across birth cohorts,
properly annualized to reflect that in the figure we plot ten years birth cohorts. The year eﬀect
is  1.9% for Brazil and  0.2% for India. The cohort eﬀect is  0.9% for Brazil and  0.4% for
India. These numbers provide a quantitative statement for the qualitative evidence that emerges
by comparing the figures: over time cohorts move out of agriculture much faster in Brazil than in
India; on the other hand, for both Brazil and India, at any given point in time younger cohorts are
employed in agriculture to a smaller extent.
Table A.II in the Appendix includes the rate of labor reallocation and the average year and co-
hort eﬀects for each country. We here succinctly summarize their joint distribution across countries
into two novel facts.
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Fact 1: Decomposition of Average Reallocation Rate out of Agriculture. In Figures IVa,
IVb and IVc, we plot the cross-cross-country distribution of, respectively, the rate of reallocation
out of agriculture, the average year eﬀect and average cohort eﬀect. For almost all countries, the
rate of reallocation out of agriculture is negative, suggesting, unsurprisingly, that most countries in
our sample underwent reallocation from agriculture to non-agriculture. We can also observe that in
most countries both the year and cohort eﬀects are negative, indicating that they both positively
contributed to structural change. The key pattern to notice is that the two distributions have
similar means, namely, -0.9% and -1.1%. Equation (4) shows that the total rate of reallocation out
of agriculture can be decomposed in the sum of year and cohort eﬀects. That is, we can write
E [log gLA,j ] = E
⇥
log  ¯j
⇤
+ E [log  ¯j ] ,
where the expectation is taken across countries j. Similar cross-country means for year and cohort
eﬀects suggest that, on average, they have a similar contribution, in a purely statistical sense, to
reallocation out of agriculture. Specifically, cohort eﬀects account, on average for all countries, for
56% of overall labor reallocation. If we restrict the attention only to low-, middle-, or high-income
countries we obtain that cohort eﬀects account for respectively 64%, 52%, and 57% of the overall
labor reallocation.
Figure IV: Distribution Across Countries (Fact 1)
(a) Rates of Structural Change
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(b) Year Eﬀects
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(c) Cohort Eﬀects
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Notes: the three figures plot the distributions of reallocation rates, cohort components, and year components across
countries.
Fact 2: Decomposition of Cross-Country Variance of Reallocation Rates. In Figures Va
and Vb, we plot, respectively, year and cohort eﬀects as a function of the rate of labor reallocation
out of agriculture. Two patterns emerge: (i) the year eﬀects are strongly positively correlated with
the rate of labor reallocation, while (ii) the cohort eﬀects are more similar across countries and
weakly correlated with the rate of labor reallocation. In other words, countries experiencing both
slow and fast structural transformation have quite similar cohort eﬀects, while countries undergoing
fast reallocation have much larger year eﬀects. This is consistent with what the Brazil vs. India
case suggested: Brazil experienced fast structural transformation and displays large year eﬀects.
To make this discussion formal, we decompose the cross-country variation in the rate of reallo-
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cation out of agriculture as follows
Var [log gLA,j ] = Cov
⇥
log gLA,j , log  ¯j
⇤
+ Cov [log gLA,j , log  ¯j ] .
We obtain that, on average across all countries, the cohort-eﬀects component accounts for 28.9%
of the dispersion of reallocation rates. If we focus to only low-, middle-, or high-income countries,
we obtain that the across-cohorts component contribution to total variance is respectively 20.6%,
18.5%, and 16.5%.13
Figure V: Variance Decomposition (Fact 2)
(a) Year Eﬀects
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(b) Cohort Eﬀects
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Notes: the left figure plots, across countries, the year eﬀects as a function of the reallocation rates. The right figure
plots the cohort eﬀects as a function of the reallocation rates.
3.4 Interpretation and Discussion
These results can be interpreted structurally through the simple model of Section (2). Tak-
ing literally equation (2), we would conclude that changes in the supply of agricultural workers
explain, on average across countries, more than half of the labor reallocation out of agriculture,
and accounting for roughly one quarter of cross-country diﬀerences in rate of labor reallocation.
We would thus conclude that changes in the supply of agricultural workers are a key determinant
13Notice that the average contribution of the within-cohort component does not need to be a weighted average
of the contributions within each income group. In fact, the overall variance of reallocation rates takes into account
also the diﬀerences across income groups.
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of global patterns of structural transformation. This conclusion is appealing, but premature since
the benchmark model does not take into account possibly important forces; namely, reallocation
frictions and general equilibrium. Nonetheless, we find these results suggestive of a relevant role
of the supply of agricultural workers, and thus they motivate us to develop the richer model of
Section (4), which will provide a guide for proper measurement.
Finally, before moving forward, we briefly discuss further analysis, included in Appendix (C),
aimed at exploring the robustness of the empirical results. First of all, we could expect that changes
in the demographic composition, due to cohorts having diﬀerent sizes, and cohort sizes changing
over time due to mortality, could aﬀect the estimated cohort and year eﬀects. We show through a
series of exercises that, in fact, demographic composition does not mechanically drive our estimates.
Second, we use the geographical information at the sub-national level (e.g. states or districts), and
show that Facts 1 and 2 hold also if we study regional variation within countries, in the spirit of
recent work, such as Gennaioli et al. (2013).
4 The Measurement Framework: with Frictions and in General Equilibrium
We develop a general equilibrium model of frictional labor reallocation out of agriculture by
cohort. We build on the stylized model of Section 2, and add two main features: wages and prices
are determined in equilibrium, and workers face mobility frictions to move out of agriculture.14 The
model serves as the measurement tool to infer changes in the supply and demand of agricultural
workers from data on agricultural employment by birth-cohort. Further, it provides a framework
to compute their aggregate eﬀects in general equilibrium.
4.1 Environment
We next describe the economic environment. Time is discrete and runs infinitely from time 0.
Markets are complete and competitive, and individuals have perfect foresight.
4.1.1 Demographics, Preferences, and Individual Traits
Each period a cohort, indexed by c, is born. A cohort is composed by a continuum of mass
one of individuals. Individuals of cohort c enter into the labor market at time c and they work
for a total of N + 1 periods; therefore, they work each period in {c, ..., c+N}. Individuals face
an increasing and non-satiated utility for an agricultural and a non-agricultural good, possibly
changing over time, as we further discuss below. They have no disutility of labor.
All individuals have identical returns from agricultural production. Instead, the returns from
non-agricultural production are heterogeneous and determined by two characteristics: the cohort
c in which an individual is born, and his idiosyncratic returns ". We assume that " is distributed
according to Beta with parameters (v, 1), where v captures the concentration of non-agricultural
returns within cohorts. We aggregate the two characteristics (c, ") into one non-agricultural returns
14The model of Section 2 is a special case of the model in this section. Nonetheless, we repeat, for clarity the
description of all features of the economy, even those that are present even in the stylized model.
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h (c, ") through a Cobb-Douglas
h (c, ") = h c "
1   ,
where  is a scale constant; hc captures a cohort-c specific shifter;     0 is the elasticity of non-
agricultural returns with respect to the cohort shifter and 1    with respect to individual returns.
The non-agricultural returns h (c, ") account for both the relative non-agricultural productivity,
and any other non-monetary value of non-agricultural production: we let h (c, ")⌧ be the non-
agricultural productivity, where ⌧ is a constant parameter that modulates the relative role of
productivity as opposed to non-monetary values.
Notice that when either hc = h for all c, or   = 0, all cohorts are identical, when instead
hc+1
hc
> 1 and   > 0, then, the distribution of non-agricultural returns of cohort c + 1 first order
stochastic dominates the one of cohort c.
4.1.2 Production and the Problem of the Firms
There are two sectors in the economy, We call them agriculture, indexed by A, and non-
agriculture, indexed by M . Production of agricultural good requires land X and labor input LA,t,
while production of non-agricultural good only requires labor LM,t. We assume that land is owned
collectively by all individuals, who share the profits, and use them to finance consumption. Pro-
ductivity in agriculture, ZA,t, may diﬀer from productivity in non-agriculture, ZM,t. The relative
price of agricultural goods in equilibrium is given by pt, which we describe below. Production
functions are Cobb-Douglas in each sector. Summing up, the revenue functions of agriculture and
non-agriculture are given by
ptYA,t = ptZA,tX
↵L1 ↵A,t
YM,t = ZM,tLM,t.
All individuals are equally productive in agriculture, while non-agricultural productivity of an
individual (c, ") is given – as discussed – by h (c, ")⌧ , where ⌧ 2  0, 1⇤.
We assume that individuals of all cohorts are perfect substitutes and we let !t (c, ") be the
occupational choice function, that is equal to 1 if individual (c, ") at time t works in agriculture,
and 0 otherwise. As a result, agricultural and non-agricultural labor are simply given by
LA,t =
tX
c=t N
ˆ
!t (c, ") dF (")
LM,t =
tX
c=t N
ˆ
h (c, ")⌧ (1  !t (c, ")) dF (") ,
where F (") is the distribution of " within a cohort. A simple interpretation of this functional
forms is that h (c, ") reflects the human capital of individual (c, ") and non-agriculture is more
skill intensive to human capital.15 We will thus refer to h (c, ") as either human capital or non-
15This assumption is consistent with sorting of high skilled workers to non-agriculture, as widely documented in
the data (e.g. Gollin et al. (2014), Young (2013) Porzio (2017)); with the documented larger returns to skills in
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agricultural returns.
Firms choose optimally how many workers to hire, and the labor market is competitive. As a
result, workers are paid the marginal product of their labor: the individual wages in agriculture
and non-agriculture are given by
wA,t = (1  ↵) ptZA,tX↵L ↵A,t
wM,t (c, ") = ZM,th (c, ")
⌧ .
4.1.3 Mobility Frictions and the Problem of the Workers
The net labor incomes in agriculture and non-agriculture are given by
yA,t = wA,t
yM,t (c, ") = h (c, ")
1 ⌧ wM,t (c, ")
where h (c, ")1 ⌧ is the non-monetary value of non-agricultural production for individual (c, "). We
can interpret h (c, ")1 ⌧ as either a taste for non-agricultural production or an iceberg cost faced
by individual (c, "). We tie together monetary and non-monetary returns from non-agricultural
production to stress that – in fact – our methodology does not allow us to distinguish them.
Since we assume that markets are complete and that there is no disutility of labor, each individ-
ual (c, ") chooses her occupation each period – {!t}N+ct=c – to maximize the present discounted value
of her future income stream, taking as given the path of net incomes in agriculture – {yA,t}N+ct=c –
and non-agriculture – {yM,t (c, ")}N+ct=c ; and taking into account the cost associated with changing
sector – Ct (!t 1,!t, yA,t, yM,t (c, ")). That is, each individual (c, ") solves
max
{!t}N+ct=c
N+cX
t=c
 t c
 
!tyA,t + (1  !t) yM,t (c, ")   Ct (!t 1,!t, yA,t, yM,t (c, "))
!
s.t. !c 1 = 1;
where we are assuming that all individuals are born in agriculture, hence the constraint !c 1 = 1.
The mobility friction takes the following form
Ct (!t 1,!t, wA,t, wM,t) = I (!t = 1) (iyM,t) + I (!t < !t 1) fyA,t + I (!t > !t 1) fyM,t ,
with an iceberg cost that reduces the monetary value of non-agricultural wage in each period by
a fraction i, and a fixed cost to be paid to change sectors, which is given by a scalar f that
multiplies the current income in the destination sector. The iceberg cost can be interpreted as an
amenity cost – as in Lagakos et al. (2017b) – or as any other flow cost from leaving the agricultural
non-agriculture (see Herrendorf and Schoellman (2017)); and with patterns of mobility across sectors (see Hicks et
al. (2017)).
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sector, for example, generated by the exclusion from risk-sharing community – as in Munshi and
Rosenzweig (2016) and Morten (2016). The fixed cost can be interpreted as a one time mobility
cost, which might be driven by the actual moving expenses, if a move is necessary to change sector,
or by any other associated costs, such as retraining, idle time in between jobs, or even one time
emotional/distress costs.
Notice that we have assumed that the mobility frictions are constant over time and across co-
horts. Moreover, they are bounded above by i¯ and f¯ , which are explicit functions of the parameters
– included in the appendix – that guarantee that at least some workers reallocate out of agriculture.
Assumption 1. Mobility frictions are constant over time, across cohorts, and across individuals
within cohorts: for all t and (c, ")
it (c, ") = i 2 [0, i¯]
ft (c, ") = f 2
⇥
0, f¯
⇤
.
This is an important assumption. We discuss its role for the identification and interpretation
of the results at the end of this section.
4.1.4 Closing the Model: the Price of Agricultural Goods
To close the model we would need to describe how the goods’ market clears. This would require
taking a stand on the individual utility functions, the degree of openness of the economy, and the
relative world prices of agricultural and non-agricultural goods. We sidestep the full specification
of the model, and state a log-linear functional form for the relative agricultural price, which could
be interpreted as a log-linear approximation of a fully specified model.
Specifically, we let
log pt| {z }
Agr Price
= ⌘|{z}
Elasticity
0@ log ✓t| {z }
Demand
  ⌘z log zt| {z }
Supply
  ⌘L logLA,t| {z }
Agr Labor
+ ⌘H logHt| {z }
Human Capital
1A ,
where log ✓t is a demand shifter that captures the relative demand for agricultural goods; log zt is
the relative agricultural productivity, zt ⌘ ZA,tZM,t ; LA,t and Ht are aggregate agricultural labor and
non-agricultural labor productivity, or human capital, – with Ht ⌘ 1N+1
Pt+N+1
c=t
´
h (c, ")⌧ dF (").
The parameters ⌘, ⌘z, ⌘L, and ⌘H modulates the relative role of each variable in determining the
agricultural price. In particular, ⌘ = 0 is the case of a small open economy with no trade frictions
– i.e. of an economy that takes the prices of agricultural and non-agricultural goods as given. For
brevity, we will refer to this case as simply “small open economy”. Instead, when ⌘ > 0, an increase
in demand increases the relative price, while an increase in supply of agricultural goods, either due
to an increase in agricultural productivity or more labor allocated to agriculture, should decrease
the price, thus ⌘z and ⌘L are assumed to be positive. An increase in human capital, instead,
should have two opposing eﬀects on the agricultural price. It makes people richer, thus decreasing
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the demand for agricultural goods, and pushing down the agricultural price. It also makes people
relatively more productive in non-agriculture, thus possibly increasing the agricultural price. The
sign of ⌘H is thus a priori ambiguous.
We follow this reduced form approach because, as the theoretical results will clarify, for our main
purpose of identifying the changes in supply of agricultural workers and relating them to schooling,
we don’t need to pin down the full structure of the model. At the same time, the endogenous
agricultural price is needed to compute the aggregate eﬀects of changes in supply. Our research
design is not well equipped to pin down the primitive parameters of the price determination and
thus we will need to rely instead on estimates from the literature.
Finally, this approach preserves tractability, while encompassing, in reduced form, the diﬀerent
mechanisms suggested in the literature as possible drivers of structural change. To see how this
specification encompasses the previously proposed channels of structural change, it is useful to
consider a special case with homogenous labor – i.e. when h (c, ") = h for all c and ". Further,
normalize h = 1, and let – just for the sake of clarity – ⌘H = 0. Under these assumptions, in any
non-degenerate equilibrium where both sectors are active, wages must be equalized, which requires
that ptzt = 1 for all t. Substituting the expression for price and rearranging gives
logLA,t =
1
⌘L
log ✓t +
(1  ⌘⌘z)
⌘⌘L
log zt. (7)
Equation (7) shows that a decrease in demand for agricultural goods over time, for example due to
non-homotheticity in demand as in Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Comin et al. (2015), would lead
to reallocation of labor out of agriculture. Further, if the economy is suﬃciently close to a small
open economy – i.e. if ⌘ is small – then an increase in relative agricultural productivity would
push workers into agriculture, as noticed by Matsuyama (1992a). Instead, if the price elasticity
is suﬃciently large or the economy is suﬃciently close to trade – i.e. as ⌘ is large enough – a
decrease in relative agricultural productivity would push workers out of agriculture, as in Ngai and
Pissarides (2007).
4.2 Supply and Demand of Agricultural Workers
The equilibrium agricultural employment is determined by the supply and demand of agricul-
tural workers. The supply of agricultural workers depends on the characteristics of the labor force,
which determine the individuals’ willingness to supply their labor to agricultural production. The
demand for agricultural workers depends on relative price and productivity in the two sectors,
which modulate firms’ willingness to hire workers in the two sectors. Since both the labor and
the goods market clear in equilibrium, the supply of agricultural worker will indirectly eﬀect the
demand for them, through the impact on price. We next link the supply and demand of agricultural
workers to model’s primitive and state assumptions on those primitives to impose that both supply
and overall demand weakly decrease over time.
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4.2.1 Changes in the Supply of Agricultural Workers
If we keep wages and frictions constant, the change in the mass of agricultural employment
between two periods depends only on the change in the average returns from non-agricultural
production due to the characteristics of the active labor force – i.e. the supply of agricultural
workers. Therefore, we define the change in the supply of agricultural workers simply as the
diﬀerence between the average return of cohorts in the labor force at time t and t+ 1
log
1
N + 1
t+1+NX
c=t+1
ˆ
h (c, ") dF (")  log 1
N + 1
t+NX
c=t
ˆ
h (c, ") dF (") =   log
✓
ht+N+1
ht
◆ 1
N+1
=   log gh,
where in the second row we have assumed that the cohort-shifter hc changes at a constant rate
given by gh. We assume that younger cohorts have higher returns from non-agricultural production,
which leads the overall supply of agricultural workers to decrease; that is – keeping fixed the relative
wages and prices – each new cohort that enters the labor market would have less and less workers
that find it worthwhile to stay in agriculture.
Assumption 2. The returns from non-agricultural production increase across cohorts at a con-
stant rate
  log
hc+1
hc
=   log gh > 0.
4.2.2 Changes in the Demand for Agricultural Workers
From the perspective of each individual, the relative demand for labor in agriculture matters
to the extent that it aﬀects the relative wage per eﬃciency unit – i.e. wA.tZM,t . In turn, the relative
wage depends on the share of labor already in agriculture, and on the relative revenue productivity,
which is itself driven by three exogenous drivers: the demand shifter ✓t, the relative productivity
zt, and the level of human capital Ht. We have already assumed that human capital grows at a
constant rate. We further assume that also the demand shifter and relative productivity change
at a constant rate and that, combined, they lead relative agricultural wage per eﬃciency unit to
weakly decay.16 It is simple to verify, as we do while proving the propositions below, that in order
for wA.tZM,t to decrease over time, we need the following restriction to be satisfied.
Assumption 3. Demand shifter ✓t and relative productivity zt change at constant rates g✓ and
gz such that
⌘ log g✓ + (1  ⌘⌘z) log gz  max {0,  log gh} ,
where  ⌘ v (↵+⌘⌘L)+(1  )⌧⌘⌘H(1  ) .
16This assumption does not imply that the relative agricultural wage decreases. In fact, as agricultural wage per
eﬃciency units decreases, the average non-agriculture worker becomes relatively less-skilled, thus pushing down the
non-agricultural wage. The key distinction is between wages and wages per eﬃciency unit provided.
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We define log g✓z ⌘ ⌘ log g✓ + (1  ⌘⌘z) log gz. The change in the relative agricultural wage is
aﬀected by both log g✓z, and, through general equilibrium, by log gh. However, we label log g✓z
demand for agricultural workers, to distinguish the direct demand channel, from the change in
agricultural wage due to changes in the supply. We refer to the composite eﬀect of log g✓z and
log gh as the overall demand for agricultural workers. Assumption 3, as we will show in Proposition
2, guarantees that the overall demand for agricultural workers decreases, so that the year eﬀects
are negative – consistent with the empirical evidence.17
4.3 Equilibrium
We define the equilibrium, or more specifically a constant reallocation path, and provide an
overview of some of its properties. The following sections will provide a formal characterization of
the main results we use for the empirical inference.
Definition: Constant Reallocation Path. A constant reallocation path is given by a series
{LA,t, wA,t, wM,t (c, ") ,!t (c, ") for all c2 [N   t, t]}1t=0, such that, given paths for agricultural de-
mand, sectoral productivities, and cohort-specific non-agricultural returns {✓t, ZA,t, ZM,t, ht}1t=0,
firms maximize profits taking wages as given, individuals choose optimally their occupation at each
point in time taking wages as given, labor market clears in both agriculture and non-agriculture,
and the aggregate agricultural labor decreases at a constant rate, gLA =
LA,t+1
LA,t
< 1.
Consider first the frictionless case – i.e., i = 0 and f = 0. An individual (c, ") would move out
of agriculture if he earns a higher net income in non-agriculture, therefore if his non-agricultural
returns are suﬃciently high with respect to relative agricultural revenue productivity, or if
h (c, ")   hˆt = (1  ↵) ptztX↵L ↵A,t. (8)
Unsurprisingly, individuals sort to the sector where they have a comparative advantage. Using the
expression for h (c, "), we can see that there is sorting both within- and across-cohorts. Within any
cohort, the ones with high relative returns " move out of agriculture. Across cohorts, the younger
ones, that have higher cohort specific non-agricultural returns hc, have a larger share of individuals
out of agriculture. Over time, as the overall demand for agricultural workers decreases and as
the composition of the labor force changes, more and more people move out of agriculture, thus
generating aggregate labor reallocation.
The distributional assumption on the idiosyncratic return " plays an important role in gener-
ating a constant rate of labor reallocation, and ensuring tractability. For a given cohort c, we can
use equation (8) to find an expression for the ability cutoﬀ – "ˆt (c) – that defines the marginal
17Assumption 3 can be relaxed in favor of the weaker assumption log g✓z  0, which could generate positive year
eﬀects. Yet, it simplifies the solution of the model when there is a positive fixed cost. We also argue that it comes
at little cost, since its direct implication, that year eﬀects are negative, is verified in the data for the overwhelming
majority of countries.
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individual that moves out of agriculture at time t
"ˆt (c) =
h
(1  ↵) 1ptztX↵L ↵A,th  c
i 1
1  
.
The mass of workers from cohort c – lA,t (c) – in agriculture is then equal to
lA,t (c) = F ("ˆt) /
h
ptztX
↵L ↵A,th
  
c
i v
1  
, (9)
and the reallocation out of agriculture for a given cohort, after substituting for the law of motion
of ptzt is given by
log lA,t+1 (c)  log lA,t (c) = v
1    (log g✓z + ⌘⌘H log gh   (⌘⌘L + ↵) log gLA) , (10)
where log gLA ⌘ logLA,t+1   logLA,t.
Equation (10) shows that the rate of labor reallocation for a given cohort is constant over time
– as long as the aggregate gLA is constant, as we will prove to be the case. In doing this derivation,
we used the fact that the CDF of a Beta (v, 1) – over the relevant domain – is homothetic.
Last, use equation (9) to notice that the ratio between agricultural employment at time t of
cohort c and c+ 1 is given by
lA,t (c+ 1)
lA,t (c)
=
✓
hc+1
hc
◆   v1  
= g
   v1  
h :
the faster human capital grows across cohorts, the bigger the diﬀerence in their agricultural employ-
ment. Summing up, the aggregate constant reallocation rate hides substantial heterogeneity within
and across cohorts. The assumptions made guarantee tractability despite the rich heterogeneity
along two dimensions: age and ability.
Next, we discuss the role of mobility frictions. The iceberg cost i introduces a constant wedge
between agricultural and non-agricultural wages; as such, it does not aﬀect reallocation rates,
but only the level of agricultural employment at each point in time. The fixed cost f is more
consequential since it may constraint some workers, but not others, from reallocating. If a relatively
young worker finds it worthwhile to move out of agriculture, then the fixed cost is unlikely to bind,
since it is discounted over his whole future life. Instead, if a worker is still in agriculture when old,
thus having only few periods left to work, then even a small fixed cost may trap him there. In
fact, the fixed cost divides cohorts into two groups, the constrained and the unconstrained, based
on their age.
4.4 Aggregate Labor Reallocation
We start by characterizing the aggregate rate of labor reallocation.
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Proposition 1: Two Drivers of Labor Reallocation
Labor reallocation out of agriculture is given by
log gLA =
✓
v
1   
◆
| {z }
Skill Distr.
0@0@1 + ⇥D|{z}
GE
1A log g✓z| {z }
Demand
+
0@1 + ⇥S|{z}
GE
1A   log gh| {z }
Supply
1A ,
where ⇥D ⌘   v(↵+⌘⌘L)1  +v(↵+⌘⌘L) and ⇥S ⌘  
v(↵+⌘⌘L)+(1  )⌧⌘⌘H
1  +v(↵+⌘⌘L) .
Proof. See Appendix.  
Labor reallocation out of agriculture – i.e. log gLA < 0 – can be triggered by two distinct forces:
(i) decrease in the demand for agricultural labor, either due to changes in relative demand or
productivity; (ii) decrease in the supply of agricultural labor, through the entrance of new cohorts
in the labor market. The direct eﬀect of each term is mediated by general equilibrium forces and by
the within cohort distribution of skills, which determines the mass of marginal workers that would
leave agriculture for a small change in relative wages. The decrease in demand for agricultural
labor has an unambiguous eﬀect since ⇥D 2
⇥
0, 1
 
. The decrease in supply, instead, could either
pull people out of agriculture or into agriculture depending on parameters’ values, in particular on
the price elasticity ⌘.18 We will further discuss general equilibrium forces in Section (7). Mobility
frictions are irrelevant for the aggregate rate of labor reallocation, even though they do aﬀect the
level of agricultural employment in each point in time.19
Finally, notice that the model of Section (2) is a special case when general equilibrium is muted
– i.e. ⇥D = ⇥S = 0.
4.5 Labor Reallocation by Cohort
While the mobility frictions do not impact the aggregate rate of labor reallocation, they do have
an eﬀect on how this rate is partitioned into year and cohort eﬀects.20 Nonetheless, as the next
proposition shows, controlling for age eﬀects is suﬃcient to restore the simple insight illustrated in
Section 2; namely that cohort eﬀects allow us to identify the changes in the supply of agricultural
workers.
Proposition 2: Decomposition of Labor Reallocation
Consider the regression
log lA,t,c| {z }
agr share of cohort c at time t
= T˜t|{z}
year dummies
+ C˜c|{z}
cohort dummies
+ A˜t c|{z}
age dummies
+ "t,c
18In a small open economy – when ⌘ = 0 – the eﬀect of a decrease in supply is unambiguous and pulls people out
of agriculture.
19We are assuming that frictions are suﬃciently small as to generate positive reallocation. Trivially, if f !1 or
i!1, there would be no reallocation. Proposition 1 thus shows that, in general, the reallocation is either zero, or
does not depend on f and i. Our parametric restriction excludes the case in which reallocation is zero.
20We can always statistically decompose the aggregate reallocation rate into year and cohort eﬀects.
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estimated using model-generated data and imposing the linear restriction that A˜0 = A˜1 – i.e. that
the first two age eﬀects are identical.21 Further, define
log  ˜t ⌘ T˜t   T˜t 1
log  ˜t = logLA,t   logLA,t 1   log  ˜t.
The estimated year and cohort components are, for all t,
log  ˜t =
✓
v
1   
◆ 
(1 +⇥D) log g✓z  ⇥S  log gh
!
log  ˜t =  
✓
v
1   
◆
  log gh.
Proof. See Appendix.  
The next corollary shows that omission to include the age eﬀects would bias the estimates.
Corollary 1: Bias in the Basic Decomposition
Consider, instead, to run with model-generated data the regression of Section ( 3.1). The estimated
year and cohort components would be
log  ¯ =
 
1    (f)
!
log  ˜
log  ¯ = log  ˜+
  (f)
1    (f) log  ˜
where the friction parameter   (f) 2 ⇥0, 1  is increasing in the size of the fixed cost f and does not
depend on the iceberg cost i.
Proof. See Appendix.  
Including age eﬀects in the regression, under the identifying assumption that they are identical in
the first two periods that a cohort is working, allows us to use the cohort eﬀects to recover the partial
equilibrium eﬀect of changes in the supply of agricultural workers on aggregate reallocation. The
same regression provides, using the year eﬀects, the change in the overall demand for agricultural
workers, given by the direct demand eﬀect in general equilibrium –
⇣
v
1  
⌘
(1 +⇥D) log g✓z – and
the general equilibrium component of the supply changes –
⇣
v
1  
⌘
⇥S  log gh.22
As Corollary 1 shows, if we don’t control for age eﬀects – as was done in Section (3.1) – we
would recover biased estimates. The reason is that the fixed mobility cost f constraints individuals
in older birth-cohorts. As shown in Corollary 2, there exists a marginal age aˆ (f) such that all
21As it is well known, we need to impose at least one linear restriction to estimate a regression with year, cohort,
and age dummies.
22The year eﬀect is negative if and only if Assumption 3 is satisfied: ⌘ log g✓+(1  ⌘⌘z) log gz  max {0,  log gh} .
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individuals in cohorts older than aˆ (f) do not reallocate out of agriculture, while all individuals
in cohort younger than aˆ (f) reallocate at the unconstrained rate, given by log  ˜t.23 Including the
age eﬀects, under the proposed linear restriction, is suﬃcient to pin down the unconstrained year
component, and thus the true cohort component.
Corollary 2: Reallocation Rates by Age
If the fixed cost is equal to zero, f = 0, then individuals of all ages reallocate at identical rate
log t (c) = log  ˜
for all (t, c). If f > 0, there exists an age cutoﬀ, aˆ (f) such that individuals younger than aˆ (f)
reallocate at the unconstrained rate, while those older do not reallocate at all. The friction   (f) is
given by the share of constrained cohorts
  (f) =
N + 1  aˆ (f)
N + 1
.
4.6 Frictions and Wages
As Proposition 2 shows, one advantage of our research design is that we can back-out changes
in the supply and demand of agricultural workers without the need to rely on direct measurement
of either wages or prices. Nonetheless, as we show next, the model generates predictions for
agricultural wages which are consistent with the data. We also clarify that wages are not useful to
back-out the size of the frictional parameter   (f).
Proposition 3: Agricultural Wage Gaps
Let (cˆt, "ˆt) be a mover to M at time t and w¯M,t ⌘
Pt
c=N t
´
wM,t (c, ") dF be the average wage in
M , then for all periods t
log w¯M,t   logwA,t| {z }
Cross-Sectional Wage Gap
> logwM,t (cˆt, "ˆt)  logwA,t| {z }
Wage Gap for Movers
,
and the wage gap for movers is given by
logwM,t (cˆt, "ˆt)  logwA,t =   log (1  i) + log (1 + (1  gpA ) f)  (1  ⌧) log hˆt
where gpAis the growth rate of ptZA,t, and (1  ⌧) log hˆt is the non-monetary value of non-agriculture
for the movers.
23The presence of constrained cohorts may seem surprising given the continuum of heterogeneous individuals in
each cohort. The reason this could happen is that the model is dynamic. Consider two marginal types: the lowest
" that is constrained by the fixed cost, and the lowest " that finds it worthwhile to move out of agriculture. As a
cohort ages, the first type increases, while the second decreases. The age aˆ (f) corresponds to the time period when
the two marginal types cross. After this period, there is no reallocation since the marginal type that would not be
subject to the constraint has already moved out of agriculture in a previous period.
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Proof. See Appendix.  
Proposition 3 shows that observing a low wage gap for movers, as has been shown in recent
literature (see Hicks et al. (2017), Alvarez (2017), Herrendorf and Schoellman (2017)), is suﬃcient
to exclude a large iceberg cost or other non-monetary costs, captured by (1  ⌧) log hˆt. However,
it is not suﬃcient to exclude a large fixed cost. In fact, conditional on an individual not being
constrained, the fixed cost aﬀects his moving decision only through discounting.24 Notice that
even long panels are not suﬃcient to back out the size of the fixed cost from wages. We would
need to observe the whole wage paths in agriculture and in non-agriculture for both movers and
non-movers. Such data is simply impossible to generate. For this reason, it is important to provide
a methodology that allows us to overcome direct measurement of   (f), which we can, in fact,
recover ex-post by comparing our estimates for log  ˜ and log  ¯.
The model replicates another salient empirical fact: in countries where data is available, wage
gaps between agriculture and non-agriculture in the cross-section have been shown to be much
larger than the wage gaps observed for movers out of agriculture. The model matches this fact
since movers are indiﬀerent between agriculture and non-agriculture, and thus they have lower
non-agricultural productivity than the average non-agricultural worker.
4.7 Revisiting the Three Questions
The model provides the analytical counterparts to the three questions we ask in this paper, and
oﬀers a framework to answer them.
First Question: Did the supply of agricultural workers decreased over time and by how much?
In order to provide an answer to this question, we want to measure    log gh for each country.
Proposition 2 shows that a within-country regression of agricultural employment on year, cohort
and age dummies is suﬃcient to recover  
⇣
v
1  
⌘
  log gh, which allows to quantify the change
in supply of agricultural workers in terms of their partial equilibrium eﬀects on aggregate labor
reallocation. We can further use wage variance in non-agriculture to bound
⇣
v
1  
⌘
. We tackle this
question in Section 5.
Second Question: Did the increase in schooling cause the decrease in the supply of agricultural
workers? We want to measure whether the average schooling of a cohort is correlated with the
measured human capital shifter hc, and whether this relationship is causal. We tackle this question
in Section 6.
Third Question: Did the decrease in the supply of agricultural workers led to aggregate labor
reallocation out of agriculture and by how much? As Proposition 1 shows, to answer this question
we need to use the estimates  
⇣
v
1  
⌘
  log gh recovered to answer the first question, and take stand
on the strength of the general equilibrium, which is modulated by the ⇥S . We tackle this question
in Section 7.
24This result is driven by two features of our environment: (i) the decision to move out of agricultural is dynamic,
hence individuals can choose to postpone it; (ii) relative wages change over time. As a result of these two features, the
fixed cost mainly aﬀects the timing of the movement out of agriculture, and it impacts the wage gap only marginally
through discounting.
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4.8 Discussion
To conclude this section, we discuss how the model’s assumptions might aﬀect inference and
interpretation.
We assumed that the frictions are constant over time and across cohorts. This is an identifying
assumption. If frictions change across cohorts, we would not be able to distinguish them from a
change in relative non-agricultural returns. If frictions change over time, we would not be able –
with our data – to distinguish them from a change in the demand for agricultural goods. While
we need to keep this caveat in mind for the interpretation of the results, this assumption does
not invalidate our main conclusion: a decrease in the friction across cohorts would still lead to a
decrease in the supply of agricultural workers. However, in this case schooling would decrease the
cost of moving out of agriculture, rather than increasing its returns. As a result, the aggregate
implications would be aﬀected.
Similarly, we have let h (c, ") to be the product of a monetary and non-monetary return from
non-agricultural production, whose respective role is modulated by ⌧ . We have made this assump-
tion to point out that our strategy does not allow us to distinguish between the two (unless we
use wage data). Our results are, in fact, compatible with schooling changing either the relative
productivity in non-agriculture, or the relative taste for individuals to work there. Again, while this
distinction does not matter for the main take-aways on the decrease of the supply of agricultural
labor, it does aﬀect the aggregate implications.
We have also abstracted from human capital accumulation over the life-cycle. There could be,
in the data, two types of life-cycle eﬀects: i) general human capital – which would make h (c, ")
increase as a cohort ages; ii) human capital specific to the sector of employment. Recall, that – in
order to identify the year eﬀects – we need to impose a linear restriction, and the model suggests
to restrict the age eﬀect to be zero in the first years an individual is in the labor market. As a
result, if individuals accumulate general human capital while young, thus leading them to move
out of agriculture, we would overestimate the year eﬀects – thus underestimate the cohort eﬀect
and attenuate our results. Sector-specific human capital is instead more problematic. If individuals
accumulate, in the first years on the job, skills which make them more likely to stay in agriculture,
then we would underestimate the year eﬀects. In practice, whether our estimates are biased upward
or downward depends on whether experience human capital is general or sector-specific. Estimates
from Altonji et al. (2013), although admittedly coming from the United States only, suggest that
most experience human capital is general. Further, notice that age eﬀects for later periods are
controlled for in our regression framework in the next section.
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that the fixed mobility cost f does not have to represent
a monetary migration cost. In fact, it should be interpreted as a reduced form representation of
any cost associated with a sector change that is more likely to be binding for old than for young
individuals.
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5 The Partial Equilibrium Eﬀect of Schooling on Structural Transformation
We now bring the model to the data described in Section (3.1). Our aim is to measure, in each
country, whether and by how much the characteristics of the labor force changed, either shifting
towards a skill-set which is more valued out of agriculture, or increase the perceived valuation of
work outside of agriculture. In other words, we want to measure whether the supply of agricultural
workers has decreased.
5.1 Measurement
Proposition 2 provides the framework for measurement: it shows that, assuming that the observ-
able data are generated by our model, we can run a year-cohort-age regression to recover changes
in supply of agricultural workers. We cannot run a regression fully saturated with year-cohort-age
dummies, due to their collinearity. As shown in Deaton (1997), we need to impose at least one
linear restriction. The choice of the linear restriction determines identification and thus need to be
guided by theory. In our setting, Proposition 2 shows that we should restrict the age eﬀects to be
the same in the first two years that a cohort is employed.
In practice, rather than using a full set of age dummies, we follow recent work (e.g. Card et
al. (2013)) and include quadratic and cubic terms for age, centered around a value a¯. For each
country j of the 52 ones in our sample we run
log lA,t,c,j = T˜t,j + C˜c,j +  1,j (ac,t,j   a¯)2 +  2,j (ac,t,j   a¯)3 + "t,c,j , (11)
where T˜t,j and C˜c,j is a full set of year and cohort dummies, and ac,t,j is the age of cohort c at time
t (for country j).
The parameter a¯ determines the value at which we restrict the age eﬀects to be zero, both
in levels and in changes.25 Following Proposition 2, if we would observe a continuous stream of
data as cohort ages, we should set a¯ = 25 since our sample covers individuals 25 to 59 years old.
However, our data comes from repeated cross-sections at several years of distance between one
other, and thus we never observe a cohort reallocation behavior around age 25. Therefore, in order
to avoid to extrapolate the results from the functional form assumption, we should set a¯ to be the
average age of the youngest cohort that we observe for two repeated cross-sections. For example,
assume that for a country we observe two cross-sections 5 years part, the youngest cohort in the
first cross-section would be 30 years old in the second one, thus we should set a¯ = 27.5. On average
across all countries and time-periods, cross-sections are 9 years apart, with a mode and a median
of 10 years. Therefore, we set a¯ = 29.5. We also check that the results are robust to let a¯ vary,
following the same idea, across countries.26
Given the estimates from specification (11), we then compute – following again Proposition 2
– the year and cohort components for each country and cross-section, namely log  ˜t,j and log  ˜t,j .
25In fact, the omission of the linear term for age is necessary to have the derivative of the age terms to be zero at
a¯, which is needed for identification of the year trend.
26These results are in fact slightly stronger. They are included in appendix Section (C).
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Finally, for each country we take the average year and cohort eﬀects across all the observed time
periods just as we did in Section (3.2).27
5.2 Result: Global Shift in Comparative Advantages away from Agriculture
Table (I) includes the results. Column (3) shows the average cohort component, log  ˜j , for all
countries, and separately by income groups. On average the cohort components decreased by 0.81
% per year. There is some heterogeneity across countries: the 20th and 80th percentiles of the
distribution across countries are 0.68 % and 1.64 %, and high income countries have on average
larger (in absolute value) cohort components. In Section (6.3), we will show that the cross-country
heterogeneity is correlated with diﬀerences in schooling increase.
In order to interpret the magnitude of the results, it is useful to compare column (3) to columns
(1) and (2). Column (1) displays the average rate of labor reallocation out of agriculture. Column
(2) displays the cohort components as calculated in Section (3), hence without controlling for the
role of frictions. Fact 1 is robust: the cohort component explains a large share of labor reallocation.
At the same time, controlling for mobility frictions does attenuate the results, as would be expected.
The model provides a structural interpretation to the cohort components. If the data are
generated by our model, then
log  ˜j =  
✓
vj
1   j
◆
 j log gh,j .
The cohort component is given by the product of two objects: i) the rate of decay of the sup-
ply of agricultural workers,   j log gh,j ; ii) the elasticity of agricultural labor supply to relative
agricultural wage,
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
. At the same time, Proposition 1 shows that the product of the two
terms,  
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
 j log gh,j , has a natural interpretation: it is the aggregate eﬀect of changes in
supply of agricultural workers on labor reallocation in partial equilibrium. We can thus divide
column (1) by column (3) to recover the contribution of changes supply of agricultural workers to
labor reallocation, in an hypothetical scenario where the path of relative prices is not aﬀected by
changes in supply of agricultural workers. We conclude that, in partial equilibrium, the decrease
in supply of agricultural workers would, alone, explain 40% of labor reallocation, on average across
all countries. The shift in supply was similarly important across all income groups, with a partial
equilibrium contribution to aggregate reallocation of 37%, 35%, and 54% for low, middle, and high
income countries. This analysis unveils the first core empirical result of the paper. In the second
half the 20th century, we observed – at least in the 52 countries of our study – a dramatic shift in
the characteristics of the labor force that moved the comparative advantage away from agriculture.
Finally, in columns (4)-(6) we show the results corresponding to Fact 2 in Section (3). Con-
trolling for friction does not aﬀect Fact 2, and the model provides a structural interpretation to it.
Cross-country diﬀerences in changes in the supply of agricultural workers explain approximately
one quarter of cross-country diﬀerences in the rates of labor reallocation out of agriculture.
27In Appendix (C), we report the results separately for each time period.
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Table I: Decomposition of Labor Reallocation out of Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fact 1: Average Reallocation Fact 2: Variance of Reallocation Friction
E [log gLA,j ] E [log  ¯j ] E [log  ˜j ] Var [log gLA,j ] Var [log  ¯j ] Var [log  ˜j ] 1-
E[log  ¯j ]
E[log  ˜j ]
All Countries - 2.05 % - 1.19 % - 0.81 % 0.20 %￿ 0.05 %￿ 0.06 %￿ 29%
Low Income - 1.56 % - 1.03 % - 0.58 % 0.26 %￿ 0.04 %￿ 0.03 %￿ 47%
Middle Income - 2.17 % - 1.14 % - 0.77 % 0.12 %￿ 0.03 %￿ 0.04 %￿ 27%
High Income - 2.77 % - 1.73 % - 1.49 % 0.22 %￿ 0.08 %￿ 0.08 %￿ 15%
5.3 Quantifying the Change in Returns from Agricultural Production
As shown, the cohort component captures the joint eﬀect of two objects. Intuitively, a large
cohort component may be driven both by large changes in cohort level characteristics,   j log gh,j ,
or by a large eﬀect of cohort characteristics on agricultural employment,
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
. To quantify the
aggregate eﬀect of changes in the supply of agricultural to labor reallocation, it is not necessary
to distinguish between the two. However, it is still useful to directly measure the magnitude of
  j log gh,j for interpretation of the results. Recall, in fact, that   j log gh,j is the rate of change
of the cohort average relative return from non-agricultural production.
The model provides guidance on how to measure the elasticity
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
. First, it shows that it
depends on the extent to which overall heterogeneity is explained by cohort components. Recall
that non-agricultural return is given by h (c, ") = h c "1   , where " ⇠ Beta (v, 1). The larger  j
and vj are, the smaller is the within cohort heterogeneity of skills. If workers within cohorts have
similar returns from working in agriculture, then sorting is mostly across cohorts, and thus small
changes in cohort characteristics may lead to large changes in agricultural employment by cohort.
Second, it shows that we can use the within-cohort variance of log wages in non-agriculture to
bound
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
. In fact, the following relationship holds
Var" [logwM,t (c, ")] = ⌧2 (1   )2Var [log " | log "   log "ˆt (c)] 
✓
1   
v
◆2
, (12)
where the equality uses the equilibrium equation for wage, and the inequality is due to the properties
of the Beta distribution.28
Equation (12) shows that the within cohort standard deviation of log wages in non-agriculture
28If " ⇠ Beta (v, 1), then   log " ⇠ Exp (v). Also, the variance of a truncated exponential is smaller than the
unrestricted variance, which is v 2.
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–  M,t,j – can be used to provide an upper bound to
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
, and then, given the measured log  ˜j ,
to obtain a lower bound for the object of interest   j log gh,j . The data discussed in Section
3, does not include wages for most countries. However, Lagakos et al. (2017a) made the values
of  M,t,j available to us for each one of the eighteen countries in their sample, which span the
income distribution from Bangladesh to the United States.29 On average across all countries,
E ( M,t,j) = 0.67, ranging from 0.38 in France to 0.94 in Brazil. Since we don’t have wage data for
all countries in our sample and  M,t,j is not systematically correlated with income, we simply use
the average value, which gives the bound
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
 1.5.
Using the upper bound for
⇣
vj
1  j
⌘
, we conclude that the relative return from non-agricultural
production increase, on average across all countries, by at least 0.5% per year. Compounding
over time, our results imply that each generation has roughly 15% higher relative return from
non-agricultural production; a modest, but sizable increase, driven purely by the changing charac-
teristics of the labor force.
5.4 The Role of Mobility Frictions and Additional Approaches
Corollary 1 shows that a comparison of the year eﬀects estimated with and without controlling
for age can be used to recover the size of the frictional parameter. In fact, rearranging the first
equation we get
  (fj) = 1  log  ¯j
log  ˜j
.
We use this equation, and our estimates of log  ¯j and log  ˜j , to calculate the implied friction in
our samples of countries. The results are included in column (7) of Table (I). On average across
countries, the friction is approximately 30%, which means that individual’s reallocation decision is
constrained by the fixed cost in the last 30% of their work-life, or approximately, in our sample,
after they turn 45 years old. Rows (1)-(3) report the frictions computed separately for low, middle,
and high-income countries. The friction is considerably larger in low income countries, as could be
expected.
Finally, we mention that previous versions of this paper used alternative ways to calculate   (fj)
and then backed out log  ˜j using log  ¯j and the estimated friction. While the results vary slightly
across diﬀerent methods to impute   (fj), they are all broadly consistent and suggest a value of
the friction in the 20-30% range. We include these alternative approaches in Appendix (D).
6 The Causal (Partial Equilibrium) Eﬀect of Schooling
In this section, we argue that the global schooling increased played a relevant role in the decrease
in the supply of agricultural workers that we just documented. Our argument relies on three
29Refer to Lagakos et al. (2017a) for data description and details. Wages are constructed as earnings divided by
total hours of work in the period of observation, which is either weekly, monthly, or yearly. We drop the top and
bottom 1% of wages to check that the variance estimates are not driven by outliers. For each country, we keep the
most recent available cross-section.
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separate pieces of evidence that leverage all the data that – to our knowledge – could be brought
to bear. We first present a case study for Indonesia, which provides the most credible causal
identification. We then use within country variation in schooling and agricultural employment
across cohorts. Last, we use across countries and time periods variation in schooling growth and
labor reallocation out of agriculture by cohort.
6.1 School Construction in Indonesia
Following the seminal work of Duflo (2001), we use the INPRES school construction program,
which built 61,000 primary schools between 1974 and 1978, to provide quasi-experimental variation
in schooling. While the intensity of the program, captured by the number of new schools per pupil,
was not random, only some cohorts, those younger than 6 at the time the program started, were
fully exposed to the program. Therefore, we can run a fairly standard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
exercise: we compare cohorts fully exposed to the treatment to those not exposed to it, in districts
with higher or lower treatment intensity. The data – the 1995 intercensal survey of Indonesia –,
the identification strategy, and the specifications follow closely Duflo (2001). The reader should
refer to that article for more details.
We restrict the sample to males born between 1950 1977. Before showing the IV specification,
we focus on the first stage and reduced form. Consider the following specification
yijk = ↵ij + ⌘ik + c1k +
1977X
c=1951
(Tik ⇥ Iic)  c +
1977X
c=1951
(cik ⇥ Iic)'c + ✏ijk (13)
where (i, j, k) is an individual i, born in cohort j, and currently living in district k; ↵j is a cohort
fixed eﬀect, where the omitted cohort, ⌘k is a district fixed eﬀect; Tk is treatment intensity, defined
as number of school build per 1000 children; Ic is a dummy that takes value equal to 1 if individual
i is born in cohort c, where the control cohort is the one born in 1950; and last cik is the enrollment
in 1972. The coeﬃcients of interest are { c}1977c=1951, which be interpreted as an estimate of the eﬀect
of the program on a given cohort. We estimate specification (13) for three diﬀerent left-hand sides:
i) years of schooling, which is our first stage; ii) a dummy equal to 1 for agricultural employment,
which is our reduced form eﬀect of the program; iii) a dummy equal to 1 for non-agricultural
employment, which is useful for ensuring that the program does not simply lead workers to drop
out of the labor force, but rather make them more likely to work in non-agriculture.
We report the results on the estimated coeﬃcients and associated standard errors in Figures
VIa, VIb, and VIc. The program had a positive eﬀect on education, a negative one on agricultural
employment, and a positive one on non-agricultural employment – as expected. The coeﬃcients are
normalized to average zero for the control cohorts, that should’ve been at most marginally aﬀected
by the treatment. The figures also build confidence in the exclusion restriction, to the extent that
they suggest no diﬀerential trend prior to the program.30 As in the original paper, coeﬃcients are
mostly not significant, unless we pool the pre-and post-periods.
30When we omit the controls for children enrollment in 1972, schooling years show a pre-trend. For this reason,
we keep the controls throughout our analysis.
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Figure VI: INPRES School Construction
(a) Point Estimates for Education
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(b) Point Estimates for Agriculture
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(c) Point Estimates for non-Agriculture
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Notes: data for agricultural employment and schooling are from the 1995 intercensal survey of Indonesia (SUPAS);
data for treatment intensity are from Duflo (2001). Figure (a) shows the estimates of the cohort dummies from the
first stage regression according to specification (13) when the left hand side variable is years of schooling. Figures (b)
and (c) show the estimates for the reduce form results – from the same specification (13) – with either agricultural or
non-agricultural employment as left-hand side variables. The red dotted vertical line separates the treatment from
the control cohorts.
In order to improve power, following again Duflo (2001), we focus on the comparison of two
cohorts: a treatment cohort of individuals that were between 2 and 6 years old at the time the
program was implemented, and a control cohort of individuals that were between 12 and 17 years
old. The specification remains the same as in (13), but with only one treatment cohort, and thus
one coeﬃcient of interest, the interaction between program intensity and treatment cohort.
The first stage gives a 5%-significant point estimate equal to 0.137 (0.037): one extra school
per 1000 children increases schooling by ⇠ 0.14, just as in Duflo (2001). The reduced form gives a
5%-significant point estimates equal to  0.0086 (0.0043). In order to interpret the magnitude, we
compute an IV where we instrument for years of schooling using the interaction between treatment
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intensity and treated cohort. One extra years of school significantly (at 5%) reduces agricultural
employment by 6.27% (3.04%). This evidence shows that schooling increase impacted the relative
returns from agricultural production for the aﬀected cohorts.
6.2 Within-Country Variation Across Cohorts
Quasi-experimental variation is scarce. However, for all the countries in our sample, our data
includes cohort-level information on average schooling attainment. We next use this data to pro-
vide suggestive evidence that the causal relationship documented for Indonesia holds true for all
countries in our sample.
We would like to show a (causal) relationship between the cohort level human capital shifters
hc,j and average schooling. As a first step, we use individual level information on educational
attainment to compute the average schooling years for each cohort in our dataset. Since we observe
cohorts in multiple cross-sections, we extract average schooling by cohort using, separately for each
country, a procedure similar to the one used in DeLong et al. (2003) for the United States. We
project the log of cohort-level average schooling years on a full set of cohort dummies, a cubic in age
and cyclical year dummies as in Deaton (1997). The age cubic trend controls for late enrollment in
school (i.e. after 25 years old) and, especially, for mortality and morbidity diﬀerences by education
groups. The year dummies control for diﬀerences across survey waves in educational attainment
reporting. The cohort dummies are the coeﬃcient of interest. We transform them in levels, and
define the schooling dummy for cohort c in country j to be sc,j .
Table II: Decomposition of Labor Reallocation out of Agriculture
(1) (2) (4) (5)
Agriculture Cohort Eﬀects
(IV)
Schooling Cohort Eﬀects - 0.074 - 0.076 - 0.173 - 0.215
(0.012) (0.030) (0.014) (0.069)
County Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Cubic Trend N Y Y Y
Country-specific Trend N N Y Y
Observations 3,127 3,127 3,127 2,688
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level.
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Our main empirical specification studies the relationship between the estimated cohort eﬀects
from specification (11), C˜c,j , and cohort schooling sc,j
C˜c,j =  sc,j +DXc,j + "c,j (14)
where   is the coeﬃcient of interest, and Xc,j is a set of controls. We first estimate specification
(14) pooling all countries together. We have a total of 3,127 birth-cohorts for which we observe
both C˜c,j and sc,j . The median and mean number of birth-cohorts by country is 65. The results
are shown in Table (II). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Column (1) shows
the simplest specification that controls only for country fixed eﬀects. Cohorts with more schooling
have lower agricultural employment, as expected. This result however is fragile since it may be
driven by time trends in both variables: as already discussed, younger cohorts have more schooling
and also lower agricultural employment. Therefore, column (2) includes a cubic trend in cohorts’
birth years, and column (3) – our benchmark specification – allows the cubic trend to diﬀer by
country. Our main result is that one additional year of school decreases the agricultural cohort
eﬀect by approximately 17% (not 17 percentage points). Due to the presence of the cubic trend,
the estimated coeﬃcient captures the fact that cohorts that are relatively more educated than the
trends are also relatively less likely to work in agriculture.
In order to show the fit of the regression, we project – separately for each country – both C˜c,j and
sc,j on a constant and a cubic trend for cohorts’ birth-years. In Figure (VIIa), we plot the residuals
of the two projections against each other. The slope is, of course, negative, but most importantly
the fit is strong: deviations from the schooling trend explain 29% of the variation across cohorts in
deviations from the agricultural employment trend. Further, we run the benchmark specification
(14) separately for each country in our sample. In Figure (VIIb), we plot the point estimates  ˆj as
a function of the country real GDP per capita in 2010. The figure shows that in almost all countries
the estimated relationship between schooling and cohort eﬀects is negative and significant. It also
shows that relationship is steeper in rich countries, suggesting that one extra year of school in rich
countries may have a larger eﬀect on the relative return to non-agricultural production.
We should be cautious in interpreting the results shown as causal. Direct reverse causality
is not an issue since we measure agricultural employment after schooling is completed. Selection
of higher skilled individuals into schooling and out of agriculture is also not an issue since we are
studying cohort-level outcomes. However, two other relevant concerns remain. First of all, if parents
decision to invest in children’s education is forward looking, the estimated negative relationship
may be driven by parents anticipating higher returns from children education.31 Second, schooling
may be a signal of other cohort-level characteristics, such as early-life human capital investment,
rather than the main driver of higher relative return in non-agricultural production.
We can alleviate the first concern, but at the cost of making the second one possibly more
severe, by instrumenting for schooling using exposure to the cyclical component of GDP during
youth. The idea is simple: if children’s education is a normal good, children that grew up during
31Even though, recall that the cohort eﬀects are estimated controlling for aggregate economic conditions.
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relatively more prosperous periods are likely to have spent more years in school. In practice, we
merge our dataset with historical GDP data from Maddison (2003), which we filter using an HP
filter. For each country and each birth-cohort, we then compute 19 variables, equal to the cyclical
components of GDP per capita at birth, and at ages 1 to 18. We then use these variables to
instrument for the cohort level schooling in the pooled specification (14), where we control for
country-specific cubic trends. The first stage is strong, with an F-stat well above 10. Figure (VIIc)
plots the point estimates of the eﬀect of exposure to relatively high GDP on cohort schooling,
for all ages from 0 to 18. Reassuringly, the eﬀect is larger when we would expect to be so –
i.e. at the children’s ages when the parents need to decide whether to keep or not their children
in school. Column (4) of Table (II) reports the two stages least square estimates for  ˆIV . The
estimated magnitude is similar, and slightly larger, than the one of the benchmark specification.
In other words, birth-cohorts that have been exposed to relatively favorable economic conditions
while growing up, spend more time in school and have – 15 or more years later – a lower chance
of being employed in agriculture. Finally, notice that the number of observation declines slightly
because we don’t have available GDP data for all cohorts.
The results of this section must be interpreted as suggestive. Nonetheless, we find encouraging
that the estimated magnitudes are inline with those for the case of Indonesia, where we use credible
identification. In appendix (B), we show that running the benchmark specification using the school
construction to instrument for school provides point estimates between - 0.10 and - 0.20, depending
on how we treat the outliers.
Figure VII: Role of Schooling, Variation Across Cohorts
(a) Plot Across Cohorts
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(b) Estimates by Country
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(c) Eﬀect of GDP on Schooling
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Notes: the left figure plots, against each other, the residuals of projections of C˜c,j and sc,j on a country-specific
cubic trend. The center figure plots, as a function of Real GDP per capita,  ˆj of the regressions C˜c,j on sc,j and a
cubic trend. Coeﬃcients that are significant at 5% are in black. The right figure plots the point estimates on the
instruments of the first stage regression of cohort schooling on country specific cubic trend, country fixed eﬀects, and
dummies for GDP cycle at diﬀerent cohort ages (the instruments). The dotted line represents the 95% confidence
intervals.
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6.3 Variation Across Countries and Time Periods
As a last exercise, we treat a country-year as a unit of observation and we study the relationship
between the estimated cohort and year components and aggregate schooling growth.
Specifically, for each country-year we compute the change in the average schooling between that
year and the next available cross-section. In practice, the change in average schooling is driven by
the diﬀerence between the cohorts that exit our dataset because they become older than 59, and
those that enter for the first time. Formally, consider a country j for which we observe a cross
section at time t and one at time t+ kk,j . We compute yearly schooling change as
 sj,t =
1
kk,j
 
t+kX
c=t+k N
nt,c,jsc,j  
tX
c=t N
nt,c,jsc,j
!
where sc,j are estimated cohort schooling as previously described. We then plot across all country-
year pairs, the cohort and year components that we estimated in Section (5), as a function of
schooling change. The results are shown in Figures (VIIIa) and (VIIIb). Countries that experienced
a faster increase in schooling have also experienced a large decrease in agricultural employment due
to the cohort component.
Of course, it is hard to argue that cross-country diﬀerences in schooling growth are exogenous.
Nonetheless, we find reassuring that schooling growth is strongly correlated with the change in
supply of agricultural workers and only weakly so with the change in demand.
Figure VIII: Role of Schooling, Variation Across Country-Time Pairs
(a) Cohort Components
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(b) Year Components
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Notes: both figures have average schooling changes  sj,t on the x-axis; the left figure has cohort components, log  ˜t,j ,
and the right figure has year components, log  ˜t,j , on the y-axis.
37
7 The Aggregate (General Equilibrium) Eﬀect of Schooling
We have established that the supply of agricultural workers decreased in almost all countries
and that the increase in schooling likely played a central role in this process. We next turn to the
third and last question and study how the changes in supply aﬀected the aggregate rates of labor
reallocation.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2 we can express the aggregate eﬀect on labor reallocation of
changes in the supply of agricultural workers as the product of the cohort component estimated in
Section (5) and a general equilibrium multiplier
 
✓
v
1   
◆
(1 +⇥S)   log gh| {z }
Aggregate Effect of Supply (Prop 1)
=
1  ⌧⌘⌘H
1 +
⇣
v
1  
⌘
(↵+ ⌘⌘L)| {z }
GE Multiplier
⇥ log  ˜| {z }
Cohort Component (Prop 2)
.
The equation shows that the aggregate eﬀect of supply changes depends on three sets of pa-
rameters. The first set of parameters modulates the strength of general equilibrium in the goods
market: i) the elasticity of the relative agricultural price ⌘, which captures – in reduced form –
how much the relative agricultural price is aﬀected by within country changes; and ii) the relative
elasticities to a change in the human capital stock and in agricultural labor, given by ⌘H and ⌘L.
The second set of parameters modulates the strength of general equilibrium in the labor market: i)
↵ is the role of the fixed factor in production, which pins down the decreasing returns in agriculture;
and ii) v1   is the elasticity of agricultural labor supply to relative agricultural wage, as can be seen
in equation (9). Finally, we need to calculate the elasticity of human capital stock to the cohort
eﬀect, which is given by ⌧ : when ⌧ is low, cohort eﬀects are driven by taste for non-agricultural
production, rather than change in relative productivity – or human capital – and as such the GE
eﬀects working through the human capital stock are muted.
The GE multiplier is likely to vary across countries. For example, due to the fact that they are
in diﬀerent stages of development, which would aﬀect the role of land in agricultural production,
hence ↵, or due to their size and openness to trade. It is beyond the scope of this work to measure
the GE multiplier for each country in our sample. Instead, we provide a range of estimates relying
on estimates from the literature, when available.
Partial Equilibrium. We first consider the aggregate eﬀects in partial equilibrium – i.e when
⌘ = ↵ = 0. In this case, the GE multiplier is trivially equal to 1 and the cohort components give
directly the aggregate eﬀects. Using the results shown in Table (I), we conclude that – in partial
equilibrium – the decrease in supply of agricultural workers could explain, on average, 40% of the
total observed reallocation out of agriculture. We believe this to be a likely upper bound of the
aggregate eﬀect for most countries.
Small Open Economy. Next, consider the case that we have labeled small open economy – i.e.
when the labor market is in general equilibrium, but the goods market is in partial equilibrium –
↵ > 0 and ⌘ = 0. In order to compute the aggregate eﬀect, we need to pin down the values of⇣
v
1  
⌘
and ↵. First, notice that the GE multiplier is decreasing in both parameters: a high
⇣
v
1  
⌘
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implies that a small movement in the wage leads to a large reallocation of labor, and a high ↵
implies that a small movement in labor leads to a large change in relative wage. If
⇣
v
1  
⌘
↵ is very
large, the GE multiplier can be close to zero. How can then a large cohort component coexist with
small aggregate eﬀects? The cohort component captures the diﬀerences across cohorts in returns
from non-agricultural production, but, as younger birth-cohorts become more biased towards non-
agriculture, the older ones are being pulled back into agriculture, where they face an increasing
comparative advantage. When the GE multiplier is small, this indirect eﬀect is strong.
We have shown in Section (5), that data on wage variance provides an upper bound for
⇣
v
1  
⌘
ranging from 1 to 3 across countries, and averaging 1.5. Next, we focus on ↵, which is the land
income share in agriculture. Herrendorf et al. (2015) gives us an estimate for ↵ for the United
States: it finds ↵US = 0.07. Land, however, may have a higher income share in lower income
countries, where agricultural production is less capital-intensive. For example, in ongoing work,
Gollin and Udry (2017) estimates production function for micro plots in Uganda and Ghana and
find land shares in the range 0.40-0.50. Combining the estimates for the two parameters, gives a
GE multiplier for the small open economy ranging between 0.4 and 0.9. We conclude that, in small
open economies, the decrease in supply of agricultural workers could explain between 16% and 36%
of the observed labor reallocation.
General Equilibrium. Finally, we consider the case when both the labor and the goods markets
are in general equilibrium. In this case, we would need to pin down four parameters: ⌘, ⌘H , ⌘L, and
⌧ . The literature on structural change, has argued that, in closed economies, ⌘⌘L > 1 and, if we
assume homothetic demand, also ⌘⌘H > 1 – see, for example, Ngai and Pissarides (2007). Under
this parametric assumption, and further letting ⌧ = 1, the decrease in supply of agricultural labor
would pull labor into agriculture, since the GE multiplier would turn negative. In fact, this result is
not particularly surprising. When ⌧ = 1, the decrease in the supply of agricultural workers increases
the relative productivity of non-agricultural production. If the elasticity of substitution between
agricultural and non-agricultural goods is below one, which in our setting maps into ⌘⌘L > 1 and
⌘⌘H > 1, then the agricultural price would increase so much as to make relative revenue labor
productivity increase in agriculture.
Allowing for ⌧ < 1 and considering non-homothetic demand can turn, depending on the mag-
nitudes of parameters, the GE multiplier positive and large. If ⌧ = 0, the change in relative return
from non-agricultural production is purely driven by a change in preferences or in the cost of work-
ing in non-agriculture, and not by a change in relative productivity. As a result, the argument of
the previous paragraph would not apply and the GE multiplier would turn positive. At the same
time, the increase in human capital – as long as ⌧ > 0 – generates an income eﬀect. If demand
is non-homothetic, the income eﬀect would lead to an increase in the demand for non-agricultural
goods. The parameter ⌘H captures both the income eﬀect and the relative productivity eﬀect of
human capital. If the former dominates, then ⌘H < 0, thus turning the GE multiplier positive, and
possibly even bigger than one.
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8 Conclusion
This paper explored the hypothesis that the steep increase in schooling observed during the
20th century might have contributed to the process of structural transformation, by equipping the
new generations of workers with skills more useful to be employed out of agriculture.
We used theory and evidence to bring support to the hypothesis. We developed a methodology
to infer changes in the relative supply of agricultural labor from micro level data on agricultural
employment by cohort. We concluded that, as a result of changing characteristics of the labor
force, the supply of agricultural workers decreased steeply. We then showed, exploiting diﬀerent
sources of variation, that schooling seems to have played a key role in transforming the labor force.
Finally, we studied the aggregate implications. With fixed prices, the documented supply shift,
could explain as much as 40% of global labor reallocation out of agriculture. However, when both
labor and goods market are in equilibrium, the net eﬀects are ambiguous, and likely to vary across
countries.
We think that it is premature to conclusively argue that the increase in schooling led to large
labor reallocation out of agriculture. More work is still needed to pin down the general equilibrium
eﬀects in all countries. Nonetheless, we believe that this paper has highlighted that changes in the
supply of agricultural labor, and the role of schooling in causing them, should be major players in
any theory of structural transformation.
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